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By Jason G. Schutte


Plaintiff fell and injured herself at a grocery store. Plaintiff sought to utilize the snow removal contractor’s contract with the property owner as basis to establish liability for her fall on snow/ice at the property. Plaintiff did not establish that (1) she relied on contract between property owner and snow removal contractors to remove all snow/ice or (2) that snow/ice was unnatural accumulation, thus barring her recovery in this personal injury action.

Facts of Case:

This case revolves around a slip and fall injury occurring at Food 4 Less, a grocery store, on November 12, 2013.[i] Plaintiff Jordan slipped on an access ramp on “black ice” near the store entrance. She did not observe the ice until after the fall. There was no snow on the ground and the temperature was below 32 degrees. Plaintiff suffered an ankle injury requiring surgery.[ii]

Defendant Food 4 Less had a contract with Cherry Logistics which in turn had a contract with Pete’s Lawn Care to provide snow and ice removal on the location where the fall took place. Plaintiff Jordan was not aware of either contract at the time of her fall at the property. She testified via deposition that she had never heard of Cherry Logistics or Pete’s Lawn Care.[iii]

Food 4 Less’s contract with Cherry Logistics provided that Cherry Logistics would monitor weather conditions and “act reasonably” in determining when to apply de-icer to the store’s sidewalks and parking lot.[iv]

“Cherry Logistics’ contract with Pete’s Lawn Care contained much more detail on the obligations of Pete’s Lawn Care. Subsection b (“Salting”), from that contract provided:

  • “i. Salting will commence once ice builds up or slippery conditions exist on pavement.
  • “iii. [Pete’s Lawn Care] shall monitor the Location for any patches of ice, and for any thaw and re-freeze, and shall apply ice melting agent in sufficient quantities to keep all Areas clear and safe.”[v]

Subsection c of the contract, which governed Handicap areas, provided that “[e]xtra attention must be given to all handicap sidewalk ramp access areas and designated handicap parking spaces during business hours. These areas must be cleared of any snow, slush, or ice down to bare pavement at all times.”

Subsection h governed when services were to commence and stated:

  • “i. Business Hours: Services shall start once snow accumulates to one (1) inch and no later than six (6) am on the day of snowfall or when ice builds up or slippery conditions exist on pavement, and shall continue during and following the ice/snow storm (Event) until the goal of bare pavement has been achieved.”
  • Non-Business Hours: All Areas shall be free of snow, slush, and/or ice * * * not less than one (1) hour prior to Location opening.”[vi]

Food 4 Less store’s hours of operation were from 6 a.m. to midnight.[vii]

Weather reports submitted by the plaintiff indicated that there was light precipitation on the day before prior to the fall. Rain began around 11:00 a.m., at which time the temperature was 45 degrees. Light snow began as temperatures fell through the afternoon. A low temperature of 25 degrees was reached shortly after midnight. There was no precipitation on the day of the accident; however, the temperature stayed below 32 degrees in the morning, then rose to 33 degrees from around in the afternoon, then dropping below 32 degrees. Pete’s did not perform any snow or ice removal actions at the location in question in November 2013, prior to plaintiff’s fall.[viii]

Plaintiff sued both Food 4 Less and Pete’s Lawn Care. She alleged “that defendants were negligent in monitoring weather conditions to determine whether snow and ice removal services were required, and they were also negligent in removing snow and ice from access ramps on the property.”[ix] The trial court granted summary judgment in “finding that there was no evidence (i) of an unnatural accumulation of snow or ice, (ii) that defendants had actual or constructive notice of snow or ice, or (iii) that defendants breached any contractual duty.”[x]

Court Ruling:

The Appellate court noted that the natural accumulation rule provides that property owners do not owe a general duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice from their property. Hence, to succeed in a slip and fall case caused by snow or ice, the plaintiff must generally establish that (1) the accumulation of snow or ice was unnatural and (2) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition.[xi]

There was no argument in this case that the ice accumulation in question was unnatural, rather, plaintiff asserted that defendants voluntarily assumed a contractual duty to remove natural accumulations of ice, and were liable in tort to third parties for negligently failing to fulfill that duty.[xii]

The court noted that plaintiff’s cause of action for voluntarily assuming a duty to remove snow/ice was governed by section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:

““One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).”[xiii]

The court noted that sections (a) and (b) did not apply to the facts of this case, leaving only section (c) as the possible avenue for liability. Plaintiff did not assert that she personally relied on the two contracts at issue in this case. In fact, she admitted in her deposition that she had never heard of Cherry Logistics or Pete’s Lawn Care.[xiv]

Liability under subsection (c) can also be based upon reliance of the third party or “the other”—i.e., the party to whom the defendant undertook to provide services. Plaintiff asserted that “(i) Food 4 Less relied on Cherry Logistics to perform snow and ice removal per the terms of their contract; (ii) likewise, Cherry Logistics relied on Pete’s Lawn Care to fulfill its contractual duty; and (iii) their reliance entitles Jordan, as a third-party beneficiary of the Food/Cherry and Cherry/Pete contracts, to recover in tort for her injuries because Pete’s Lawn Care allegedly failed to fulfill its contractual duties.”[xv] The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments on this point.

The Jordan court noted that Illinois courts are split regarding whether a party who contracts to remove snow and ice, and then fails to do so, can be liable under section 324A(c) to third parties. That being said, “Illinois courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the existence of a snow removal contract overrides the natural accumulation rule.”[xvi]

The Jordan court ruled that merely entering into a snow removal contract does not create in the contracting parties a duty to protect third parties from natural accumulations of snow and ice when the third parties did not personally rely on the contract. Because Jordan did not present evidence that (1) the ice on which she fell was an unnatural accumulation or that (2) she relied on the Food/Cherry and Cherry/Pete contracts, she could not establish liability against the defendants and summary judgment was appropriate.[xvii]

Effect of Case:

As mentioned above, the Jordan court noted (and discussed in further detail in the opinion) that there are split authorities on the issue of third party liability in voluntary assumption of duty situations; however, this case presents a common sense approach to evaluation of these types of claims.

Generally a plaintiff must show that there was an unnatural accumulation of snow/ice in order to establish liability against the property owner or snow removal contractor. If this cannot be done, then an alternative avenue to establish liability would be through the assumption of duty cause of action described herein. If the plaintiff intends to pursue this avenue, they will need to establish (1) that there was an assumed duty to remove all snow/ice (as we are assuming that there is no evidence of unnatural accumulation) and (2) that the plaintiff relied on this assumed duty. If these factors cannot be met, then the plaintiff likely will not be able to establish liability against the defendant.


[i] Jordan v. Kroger Co d/b/a Food 4 Less and Pete’s Lawn Care, Inc., 2018 IL App (1st) 180582, ¶4;

[ii] Id.;

[iii] Id. at ¶5;

[iv] Id.;

[v] Id. at ¶6;

[vi] Id. at ¶¶6-8;

[vii] Id. at ¶¶6-8;

[viii] Id. at ¶9;

[ix] Id. ¶10;

[x] Id. ¶¶10 & 14;

[xi] Id.at ¶18;

[xii] Id. at ¶19;

[xiii] Id. at ¶20;

[xiv] Id. at ¶¶21-22;

[xv] Id at ¶22;

[xvi] Id. at ¶23;

[xvii] Id. at ¶35;

Congratulations to Jason G. Schutte in publishing an article with the Illinois State Bar Association discussing the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine in premises liability involving snow and ice. Jason is a partner with our firm and focuses his practice in defense of liability and personal injury claims. He frequently authors articles discussing issues in tort law/civil liability claims.

By: Jason G. Schutte

Here in Illinois, winter weather such as snow and freezing rain, often create conditions that lead to slips and falls by patrons of businesses, invitees to personal residences or members of the general public. These slips/falls inevitably lead to personal injury claims and lawsuits.

The most common, “go to” defense against theses type of claims involving snow and ice is the argument that the injured party slipped or fell over a “natural accumulation” of snow/ice. The injured party inevitably argues that the property owner acted in some fashion so as to create an “unnatural accumulation” of ice or snow which created the conditions causing their fall. As a general rule, the natural accumulation defense provides very good protection to property owners in Illinois, and inevitably, their liability insurers.

There are situations where the property owner does create an unnatural accumulation of snow and the aforementioned natural accumulation defense cannot be utilized to defeat the plaintiff’s claim; however, that does not mean that the property owner is without defenses to the personal injury claim. Oftentimes, attorneys, property owners and insurers may overlook one of the most common defenses to premises liability claims, the open and obvious doctrine, when evaluating these claims.

The application of the open and obvious condition doctrine was recently analyzed in the Fourth District Appellate case Winters v. Mimglii Arbors at Eastland, LLC.

Facts of the case

In Winters, the plaintiff claimed that he slipped on an unnatural accumulation of snow at the apartment complex where he resided.[i] He asserted that in January of 2014, Defendant Changing Seasons pushed snow from Arbors’ (property owner/landlord) parking lot onto a sidewalk. Plaintiff left his apartment to walk to a laundry facility located on site at the apartment complex. He walked on the sidewalk that he alleged was blocked by the snow pushed by Changing Seasons and slipped due to the snow blocking the sidewalk.[ii]

Plaintiff filed suit against his landlord, Arbors, asserting that Arbors was negligent in various ways that resulted in the unnatural accumulation of slow which caused plaintiff’s injuries.[iii] Plaintiff filed suit against Changing Seasons, asserting that they had contracted to remove snow from Arbors’ property, and did so in a negligent fashion, resulting in the unnatural accumulation of snow that caused plaintiff’s injuries.[iv]

Plaintiff admitted that he observed the large pile of snow on the sidewalk before reaching it and that his visibility was not limited.[v] He further stated that there was a “cutout in the snow pile” where it appeared that other individuals had walked through the snow pile. He decided to proceed, laundry basket in hand, and walked through the snow pile. Plaintiff further admitted that he was able to see where he was walking and was aware that he was walking on snow and ice. Plaintiff slipped and broke his ankle while walking across the snow pile.[vi] Lastly, plaintiff admitted that there were alternative paths he could have taken to reach the laundry facility that was his destination.[vii]

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting that the snow pile in question was an open and obvious condition, hence they owed no duty to plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the motions, asserting that there were genuine questions of fact on this issue and alternatively, that the deliberate encounter exception applied, defeating the open and obvious rule.[viii] The trial court granted defendants’ motions.

The basics of the open and obvious doctrine

The open and obvious doctrine can preclude any duty being owed to a particular plaintiff if the condition causing the injury qualifies as “open and obvious.” A condition on land is considered ““open and obvious” when a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence and judgment, would recognize the condition and the risk involved.”[ix] Common open and obvious conditions are fire and bodies of water, but defects on sidewalks can qualify.[x]

There are two commonly recognized exceptions to the open and obvious doctrine. First, the distraction exception, which applies when the possessor of land has reason to suspect that invitees to the property may be distracted and will fail to discover or protect themselves against the open and obvious condition. This exception only applies when evidence is presented that the plaintiff was actually distracted.[xi]

Second, the deliberate encounter exception, applies when the possessor of land has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because a reasonable person in the invitee’s position would do so. This exception most commonly is applied in cases involving some kind of economic compulsion, but its presence is not a per se requirement.[xii]

Appellate Findings in Winters

 The appellate court in Winters found that the snow on the side walk was, in fact, an open and obvious condition in light of the fact that all parties were aware that it was present. The court further found that the deliberate encounter exception not apply as plaintiff knew there were alternative routes to his destination, the laundry facility, which he could have taken to avoid traversing the snow pile.[xiii] Further, there were no economic factors compelling plaintiff to traverse the snow pile in question.


The court did not analyze whether the distraction exception applied; however, it is clear that it would not as plaintiff admitted that he could see the snow pile in question, and, was aware of its presence. The court affirmed the trial court’s granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.


These types of cases are certainly fact specific and dependent. When evaluating the viability of a personal injury claim arising from injuries related to ice or snow accumulation, it would behoove attorneys, property owners, claims representatives and other interested parties to consider not only the natural accumulation rule but also, whether a viable defense is presented through the open and obvious condition doctrine.

The two may be able to be asserted simultaneously or, as in the Winters case, it may be very clear that the snow/ice accumulation in issue is unnatural; however, it may be equally clear that the accumulation is an open and obvious condition which would not place any duty upon the property owner to remove or remediate the condition.


[i] Winters v. MIMG LII Arbors at Eastland, LLC, et. al., 2018 IL (4th) 170669, ¶1;

[ii] Id. at ¶9;

[iii] Id. at ¶10;

[iv] Id. at ¶11;

[v] Id. at ¶18;

[vi] Id. at ¶18;

[vii] Id. at ¶19-20.

[viii] Id. at 36-37;

[ix] Id. at 51, citing Olson v. Williams All Seasons Co., 2012 IL app (2nd) 110818 ¶42;

[x] Id.;

[xi] Id. at 52;

[xii] Id. at 53;

[xiii] Id. at 69;

[xiv] Id. at 74;


 The Illinois Appellate Court confirms that Defendants in a tort action are not entitled to set off/credit for benefits received by Plaintiff from underinsured motorist benefits received from Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy.

 Underlying Facts     

This lawsuit revolves around a personal injury claim. Plaintiff was participating in an annual Halloween parade organized by the City of Flora. Plaintiff’s antique tractor was the last vehicle in the parade. Plaintiff was standing beside his tractor when a vehicle driven by Curt Jordan collided with the rear of the antique tractor.[i]

Jordan was insured by Geico Indemnity Company (herein Geico). Geico tendered $20,000.00 to Plaintiff pursuant to a Release and settlement agreement. Plaintiff filed an underinsured motorist claim with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance company (herein State Farm), his insurer. State Farm tendered $280,000.00 to Plaintiff pursuant to that claim.[ii]

Subsequently, Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against the City of Flora and the Flora Chamber of Commerce asserting negligence, willful and wanton conduct and loss of consortium.[iii] The City of Flora and the Chamber filed Affirmative Defenses asserting a right of set off of $311,000.00 against any judgment the Plaintiff might receive based upon Plaintiff’s receipt of $20,000.00 from Geico, $280,000.00 from State Farm via the underinsured motorist policy, $10,000.00 from State Farm via medical payments made from the automobile policy and based upon Plaintiff’s alleged receipt of $1,000.00 from a victim’s advocacy fund.[iv]

The Chamber further asserted that the $311,000.00 received by Plaintiff “is in full satisfaction of any and all claim that [Plaintiff has] against [the Chamber], and would act as a set off and bar of any judgment claimed that Plaintiff has against this Defendant”.[v]

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Chamber’s Affirmative Defenses and asserted that the collateral source rule prevented benefits received by an injured party from a source wholly independent in collateral to the tortfeasor from diminishing damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Chamber’s Affirmative Defenses regarding set off.[vi] Subsequent to a jury verdict being entered, the court granted the Chamber’s Motion for Set Off for both the sum of $20,000.00 paid by Geico and the sum of $280,000.00 paid by State Farm.[vii]

The collateral source rule and its application

Under the collateral source rule, benefits that an injured party receives from a source completely independent and collateral to the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from that tortfeasor. Although these benefits are received by the injured party due to the injury in question, they cannot be credited against a tortfeasor’s liability even though they may cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.[viii] The rule denies the tortfeasor any corresponding credit or offset for said benefits. Essentially, the benefits reduce the Plaintiff’s loss but do not reduce a Defendant’s tort liability.[ix]

The collateral source rule has both evidentiary and substantive effects. The rule prevents a jury from learning anything about the collateral source (i.e. extraneous benefits received), thus, providing a rule of evidence at trial. The rule also prohibits a Defendant from reducing a Plaintiff’s compensatory award by the amount the Plaintiff received from the collateral source thus providing a substantive rule governing damages.[x]

Illinois law is well settled that damages recovered by a Plaintiff from the Defendant are not decreased by the amount the Plaintiff has received from insurance proceeds (a collateral source) where the Defendant did not contribute to the payment of insurance premiums.[xi] The underlying justification for this rule is that the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contracts or other relationships that may exist between injured parties and third persons.[xii]

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff received the benefit of payment under his underinsured motorist policy with State Farm wherein he received $280,000.00 due to the accident at issue in the case. The Plaintiff received a benefit bargained for and provided by Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s own benefit. The payment was not made by or on behalf of the tortfeasor. Thus, State Farm was a third party source wholly independent and collateral to the tortfeasor and the collateral source rule applied.

Hence, the Defendant, the Chamber of Commerce, was not entitled to any corresponding set off or credit for the monies paid to Plaintiff via the underinsured motorist policy and those payments cannot be utilized to reduce the Chamber’s tort liability to the Plaintiff.[xiii] There was no argument presented regarding the $20,000.00 paid by Geico. These monies would have been contributed by a joint tortfeasor and certainly Defendant was entitled to set off of these proceeds against the jury verdict.

The Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the trial, and found that the Chamber of Commerce was not entitled to set off of the $280,000.00 from Plaintiff’s underlying insurance policy.

Effect of case

Generally, a plaintiff may only have one satisfaction/recovery for an injury.[xiv] In the case at bar, Plaintiff certainly seems to be able to pursue double recovery for his injuries; however, the Stanford court clearly notes that the collateral source rule is an exception to the policy against double recovery.[xv]

In cases involving multiple tortfeasors, it will certainly pay to be cognizant of and investigate any and all potential recoveries that the injured party has received or may receive from other sources. Monies paid by a separate tortfeasor will most certainly allow for set off against any jury verdict rendered in the case. Monies or benefits received by the injured party from insurance proceeds procured by the injured party will not allow for such a set off.

Having a proper understanding of the collateral source rule and its effect on underinsured motorist claims and related benefits received by an injured party will certainly help personal injury Plaintiffs, and Defense attorneys along with insurance adjusters and claims representatives in accurately evaluating the value of a personal injury claim and exposures at trial.

Claims representatives and defense counsel should certainly investigate any benefits received by Plaintiff to determine if there is a plausible basis to pursue set off. This will not only protect the Defendant at the close of trial but also provide a strong bargaining tool during settlement negotiations.

In practice, Plaintiff’s counsel will often object to production of information pertaining to benefits a Plaintiff has received under the collateral source rule. The author believes that the aforementioned case law can be utilized to force Plaintiff to produce information regarding any benefits already received regardless of whether the collateral source rule may bar the benefits from reducing any award or from evidence at trial. The argument to present in this case is that the discovery process allows for production of any and all information that may lead to discoverable material. Hence, in Illinois the discoverability of information is much wider than the admissibility of information at trial.

Counsel will need to argue that they are entitled to production of this information to fully evaluate the viability of Plaintiff’s claim, whether lien/subrogation interests may be applicable to the claim and whether a set off is allowed for benefits received. The assertion will need to be supported by the position that the information may or may not be admissible at trial and that decision can be made by the court at a later date. The Defendant is only seeking, at the time of discovery, the right to determine whether the benefits received might be utilized for set off at trial or whether they are, in fact, barred under the collateral source rule.


By Jason G. Schutte


[i] Stanford v. City of Flora, et. al., 2018 IL App (5th) 160115, ¶3;

[ii] Stanford at ¶4;

[iii] Stanford at ¶¶3-4;

[iv] Stanford at ¶6;

[v] Id.;

[vi] Stanford at ¶8;

[vii] Stanford at ¶11;

[viii] Stanford at ¶15;

[ix] Stanford at ¶16;

[x] Stanford at ¶17;

[xi] Stanford at ¶18;

[xii] Id.;

[xiii] Stanford at ¶19;

[xiv] Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Comp., 159 Ill.2d 137, 172 (1994);

[xv] Stanford at ¶24;

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